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FRANCIS HUTCHESON AND THE HEATHEN MORALISTS
THOMAS AHNERT
University of Edinburgh
abstract
Throughout his career Hutcheson praised the achievements of the pagan moral
philosophers of classical antiquity, the Stoics in particular. In recent secondary
literature his moral theory has been characterized as a synthesis of Christianity
and Stoicism. Yet Hutcheson’s attitude towards the ancient heathen moralists was
more complex and ambivalent than this idea of ‘Christian Stoicism’ suggests.
According to Hutcheson, pagans who did not believe in Christ and who had never
even heard of him were capable of virtue, and even, he asserted controversially,
of salvation. Yet Hutcheson did not think that the virtue of pagans, let alone
their salvation, was a result of their moral philosophical theories. Hutcheson’s
applause for pagan philosophy as an intellectual achievement did not indicate
a commitment to it, but was based on a detached and cautious evaluation that
involved significant reservations concerning the truth and usefulness of pagan
ethical thought.
introduction
Throughout his career Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) professed great
admiration for the pagan philosophers of classical antiquity. In the Preface to
his first book, the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue
of 1725, he explained that he ‘took the first hints of [his opinions] from some of
the greatest Writers of Antiquity’ (Hutcheson [1726] 2008: 12). Much later, in
the Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria of 1745, a textbook intended
for his students at the University of Glasgow, Hutcheson again praised the
philosophical achievements of the ancients, whom he described as ‘the grand
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fountains of all the sciences, of all elegance; the inventers and improvers of
all ingenious arts’ (Hutcheson [1745–1747] 2007: 4). A few years before the
Institutio Hutcheson, together with the librarian and later professor of Greek
at the University of Glasgow, James Moor, had published a translation and
edition of The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, a text
that Hutcheson regarded highly (Hutcheson [1742] 2008: xxii). His frequent
praise of the ‘heathen’ moralists of classical antiquity drew criticism from
several of his more conservative fellow Presbyterians in Scotland. In 1738
an attempt was made to put Hutcheson on trial for heresy. As late as 1753,
several years after Hutcheson’s death, one of the most prominent orthodox
clergymen, John Witherspoon, ridiculed Hutcheson’s followers for believing in
the ‘saintship of Marcus Antoninus’, and accused them of preferring the pagan
philosophers of classical antiquity to Holy Scripture itself (Witherspoon 1754:
27, 48). Hutcheson’s favourable opinion of pagan Greek and Roman thought
appears indeed to contradict a traditional Calvinist emphasis on divine grace
and Christian doctrine rather than profane (let alone pagan) philosophy as the
only possible remedy for the moral corruption of human nature by Original
Sin. It has been argued that Hutcheson was especially indebted to the doctrines
of the ancient Stoics. According to James Moore and Michael Silverthorne,
Hutcheson ‘was refashioning Christian doctrine, notably the Presbyterian or
Reformed doctrine of original sin, by substituting for it a particular variant of
Stoicism. . . in which the original or natural constitution of human nature contains
something divine within: a heart or soul that is oriented towards affection
for others, good offices, benevolence’ (Hutcheson [1742] 2008: xxiii). Richard
Sher, in his seminal work on the Moderate party in the Presbyterian
church, characterized Hutcheson’s philosophy as a ‘fundamentally Stoic
edifice. . . buttressed by Christian principles’, a ‘Christian-Stoic’ synthesis (Sher
1985: 176).
Yet Hutcheson’s attitude towards the ‘heathen moralists’ of classical antiquity
was perhaps more complex than the idea of a fusion between Stoicism and
Christianity suggests. Hutcheson wrote that pagans who did not believe in Christ
and who had never even heard of him were capable of virtue, and even, he asserted
controversially, of salvation. The author of the Meditations, Marcus Aurelius,
was one such example. At the same time however, as will be shown below,
Hutcheson did not think that the virtue of pagans, let alone their salvation, was a
result of their philosophical theories. Hutcheson’s applause for pagan philosophy
as an intellectual achievement did not indicate a commitment to it, but was
based on a detached and cautious evaluation that involved significant reservations
concerning the truth and usefulness of pagan ethical thought. Hutcheson’s
scepticism about ancient philosophy may seem paradoxical, given his fulsome
praise for a figure like Marcus Aurelius, whom he even portrayed as a quasi-
Christian. But according to Hutcheson it was possible for a pagan philosopher
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to be virtuous and even in all essential respects ‘Christian’, and yet, at the same
time, for pagan philosophy to be wrong. This article seeks to explain this apparent
paradox in Hutcheson’s thinking. I shall first discuss Hutcheson’s account of
moral motivation and its foundations in human nature; I shall then turn to the
importance of his ideas on divine providence and the afterlife for his moral theory,
before finally considering why pagan moral philosophy, according to Hutcheson,
was deficient, even though individual pagan philosophers like Marcus Aurelius
might be virtuous and even capable of eternal life, as much as professed and
sincere Christian believers.
i. virtue and human nature
There was no need for philosophical reflection, Hutcheson believed, in order
to be moral. Human morality was based on a ‘moral sense’, an inborn
capacity to separate moral from immoral actions that was prior to philosophical
understanding and comparable to the ability of the eye to distinguish between
different colours. In modern literature on Hutcheson much attention has been
devoted to the epistemological status of the judgments made by this moral sense.
In particular, it has been asked, whether the judgments of the moral sense are
best described as non-cognitivist and matters of feeling, or whether they represent
a form of ‘moral realism’, involving the perception of real qualities of external
objects and actions.1 The debate on this question has yet to be concluded, but as
James Harris has argued persuasively in a recent article, the epistemological status
of moral judgments was not Hutcheson’s real concern in his moral philosophy.
Instead, he was interested primarily in the naturalness of morality, the degree
to which the preference for good over bad actions was a natural feature of the
human constitution (Harris 2008). Hutcheson considered morality to be part of
the natural order that had been created by God and that reflected his justice and
benevolence towards humanity. Moral conduct was based on instincts that were
part of the natural constitution of ‘man’. Exercising the moral sense and acting
morally, Hutcheson argued, produced feelings of pleasure in the agent that were
far superior to the crass pleasures that followed from the satisfaction of selfish
and immoral desires.
Good and bad actions were chosen by the will, but Hutcheson, unlike, for
example, Samuel Pufendorf did not think of the will as an ‘indifferent’ faculty,
suspended between the various courses of action it could choose (Pufendorf
[1673] 1991: 19). Rather, Hutcheson conceived of the will as the seat of desire
and aversion, that is, of passions that either draw the agent towards a particular
object or repel him or her from it. We feel joy or sorrow depending on whether
we have obtained something we desire or fear. These motions of the will can
also be divided into two classes, the selfish and the benevolent. According to
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Hutcheson it is just a matter of fact, evident from daily experience, that some
actions are aimed at the well-being of others and do not involve any expectation
of selfish gain, contrary to Bernard Mandeville’s infamous satire on virtue in
modern commercial societies in the Fable of the Bees (Mandeville [1732] 1988).
Humans, Hutcheson believed, are by nature able to distinguish between moral and
immoral actions: ‘Never was there any of the human species, except ideots, to
whom all actions appeared indifferent’ (Hutcheson 1755: 24). We experience the
‘most joyful sensations of approbation and inward satisfaction’, when we have a
certain ‘set of affections’ or perform the ‘actions consequent on them’ (Hutcheson
1755: 24). Whenever these affections or actions are observed in others, ‘we have
a warm feeling of approbation, a sense of their excellence, and, in consequence of
it, great good-will and zeal for their happiness’ (Hutcheson 1755: 24). The moral
sense is only one of several similar powers and dispositions, the exercise of which
is admirable, yet it is ‘by the moral sense that actions become of the greatest to
our happiness or misery’ (Hutcheson 1755: 27).
Not all actions that are really beneficial to others are the result of the
exercise of the moral sense. It is possible to desire sincerely the happiness
of others as a means to our own happiness, but such desires have ‘nothing
virtuous in them’ (Hutcheson 1755: 43). Fulfilling these desires may further the
agent’s own interests, but the ‘main question is, whether the affections reputed
benevolent are subordinated to some finer interest than worldly advantages, and
ultimately terminate upon them’ (Hutcheson 1755: 43). External actions may
be influenced by hopes or fears depending on other human beings, but these
hopes or fears cannot be considered virtuous motives, since they do not spring
from ‘any inward good-will or desire of their happiness’ (Hutcheson 1755: 43).
Since Hutcheson said that the sincere desire for the happiness of others was
also a source of pleasure in the agent, it could be argued that, ultimately,
this benevolence towards others is only a matter of self-interest. That was the
argument of Hutcheson’s contemporary John Clarke of Hull, who regarded self-
love as the foundation of morality: self-love properly understood also leads to the
performance of social duties towards others. Immorality is the result of a false
conception of self-love, not of self-love itself (Clarke 1726: 15).2 Hutcheson’s
reply was that it is impossible to will this benevolence towards others out of a
selfish desire to experience the happiness associated with it. Virtuous affections
towards others had to be based on spontaneous natural motions of the human
soul, not on calculations of self-interest: our ‘desire therefore of the pleasure of
self-approbation, or of divine rewards, can only make us desire to have these
affections, and to act a suitable part. But these affections cannot be directly
raised by the will’ (Hutcheson 1755: 45). The prospect of the pleasure of self-
approbation or rewards from God can help us to ‘surmount little interfering
interests’ that conflict with benevolence, but it cannot itself be the constant motive
for benevolence (Hutcheson 1755: 44–5). ‘Actions are conceived rewardable
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because they are good, not good because they are to be rewarded’ (Hutcheson
1755: 55).
Yet if morality is natural to humans, why then do so many individuals choose to
act immorally? One reason is that below the moral powers are the senses, which
offer ‘an immediate sense of pleasure, such as the brutes enjoy, but no further
satisfaction’ and which are ‘at best beheld with indifference’ and are often a
‘matter of shame, and the cause of contempt’ (Hutcheson 1755: 29). The early
years of humans’ lives, Hutcheson lamented, are spent in the gratification of
sensual appetites, unless there is a ‘careful education’, and ‘our selfish passions
early gain strength by indulgence’ (Hutcheson 1755: 37). There are also the
pleasures of the imagination, which are more lasting than those of the senses, but
which can also interfere with the moral sense. Such are ‘the beholding beautiful
forms, the curious works of art, or the more exquisite works of nature; the
entertainments of harmony, of imitation in the ingenious arts; the discovering of
the immediate relations and proportions of the objects of the pure intellect and
reason’ (Hutcheson 1755: 128). And both these kinds of pleasures are inferior
to the joys of sympathy, for which we will willingly forego any of the pleasures
of the sense or the imagination. Yet the ‘sympathetick pleasures’ are subject to
uncertainty, because they depend on the ‘fortunes of those we love’, which, like
all human affairs, are uncertain (Hutcheson 1755: 131).
The highest and most lasting enjoyments are those associated with the exercise
of the moral sense. They are not subject to fortune and can be experienced in
spite of external disadvantages (Hutcheson 1755: 132–3). Philosophical reasoning
can play a role in conducting humans towards the moral sense, because it makes
humans aware of the different kinds of enjoyment their nature is capable of, and
draws their attention to the ‘Governing Mind presiding in this world’ (Hutcheson
1755: 78). This kind of reasoning, Hutcheson believed, cannot produce a moral
sense, but it corroborates it by demonstrating that there is in fact no conflict
between morality and interest, and that while considerations of interest cannot
be the motive from which virtuous actions are performed, there is ‘a perfect
consistency of all the generous motions of the soul with private interest. . . and
a certain tenor of life and action the most effectually subservient to both these
determinations’ (Hutcheson 1755: 78–9).
ii. morality and providence
Hutcheson’s ideas on morality and its foundation in human nature were grounded
in a belief in divine providence. His views can be characterized as a physico-
theological argument from design: all the separate parts of nature form a
harmonious system and ‘all is full of power, activity and regular motion, wisely
and exquisitely adapted to the uses of the living and sensible parts of creation’
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(Hutcheson 1755: 172). This order has to be the work of a ‘superior all-ruling
Mind’ (Hutcheson 1755: 173). The existence of a moral sense, the exercise of
which is associated with the highest and most refined pleasure possible, is further
evidence of a Creator and his benevolent intentions for humankind. Indeed,
the existence of ‘imperfection, indigence, pain, and even moral evil in nature’
(Hutcheson 1755: 181) is necessary to provide humans with an opportunity to
exercise their moral faculty, thus experiencing its particular joys, which would
mostly be absent in a state of inaction. Moreover, ‘our sense of many high
enjoyments, both natural and moral is exceedingly heightened by our having
observed or experienced many of the contrary evils’ (Hutcheson 1755: 182).
Indigence makes possible liberality, danger, fortitude; the ‘lower appetites or
passions’ allow for temperance (Hutcheson 1755: 182). In short, virtue requires
the existence of some evils, natural and moral. Pains are also necessary to
remind humans of the requirements of self-preservation. There is also the
consideration, familiar from Malebranche and repeated by Pope in his Essay
on Man (Riley 2003; Pope [1734–5] 1950, epistle 4, v. 121–2) that it would
be highly damaging for God to suspend the operation of general laws whenever
their operation would result in some evil, because ‘all contrivance or forethought
of men, and all prudent action’ would immediately become futile (Hutcheson
1755: 186).
There is also a deeper meaning to the imperfection of human nature. Although
real malice is rare compared to the acts of virtue and benevolence, nobody is
capable of adhering perfectly to the ‘standard of virtue set up in our hearts’
and ‘thus are all conscious of guilt in the sight of God’ (Hutcheson 1755: 192).
That is a problem moral philosophy, based on natural reason, cannot solve on
its own. The existence of this universal corruption is a ‘powerful spur to a
continual advancement in perfection’, but the progress in virtue is rarely, if ever
complete, even ‘of those who live to mature age’ (Hutcheson 1755: 192). This
fact, Hutcheson says, ‘seems to carry no faint intimation, that either we once were
in a higher state of perfection, or that such a state is still before us’ (Hutcheson
1755: 193). Of course, Hutcheson believed both to be the case: humanity had been
in a higher state of perfection in the state of innocence before Original Sin, and
temporal life was going to be followed by an afterlife, in which the saved would
be rewarded and would achieve a state of perfection superior to anything possible
before death.
The afterlife was important for moral philosophy, because it is evident that the
virtuous in this life sometimes suffer undeserved distress, such as persecution or
poverty, even while they enjoy the pleasures that are the result of being virtuous.
As Hutcheson put it in his introduction to metaphysics, the Metaphysicae
Synopsis, in this life, many virtuous people are afflicted with bad fortune, whereas
many wicked people escape all temporal punishments. It could of course be
argued that these wicked people suffer the agonies caused by acting against their
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moral sense, and that material goods such as wealth are not the true reason why
the virtuous act morally. Even so, Hutcheson clearly felt that it is unjust for the
virtuous to be afflicted with such distress, while the wicked are blessed with,
for example, material prosperity. All injustices of this kind will be remedied
by the distribution of rewards and punishments in an afterlife (Hutcheson
1742: 2).
The rewards and punishments of the afterlife cannot be the proper motive for
moral actions, which have to be an expression of disinterested benevolence, but
the prospect of these rewards and punishments is of considerable significance
for moral practice: although the prospect of an afterlife cannot motivate a truly
moral action, it is capable of performing an important educative function. For
Hutcheson thought of moral behaviour as the product of a culture of the mind
(cultura animi), which allows the moral sense to assert itself against the impulses
of the inferior powers and senses. This culture does not depend on knowledge or
understanding, but on the formation of habit, which is developed and strengthened
through repeated exercise, like muscles that were formed by regular training:
The turbulent appetites and particular passions whether of the selfish or
generous kind. . . naturally arise on certain occasions. . . To govern and
restrain them an habit is necessary, which must be acquired by frequent
recollection and discipline. While we are calm we must frequently attend
to the danger of following precipitantly the first appearances of good
or evil; we must recollect our former experiences in ourselves, and our
observations about others, how superior and more lasting enjoyments have
been lost by our hasty indulgence of some pressing appetite or passions:
how lasting misery and remorse has ensued upon some transient gratification:
what shame, distress, and sorrow have been the effects of ungoverned
anger: what infamy and contempt men have incurred by excessive fear,
or by their aversion to labour and painful application. We may thus
raise an habitual suspicion of unexamined appearances, and an habitual
caution when we feel any turbulent passion arising. (Hutcheson 1755: 102)
The necessary discipline however is especially difficult to achieve for the wicked,
who have ‘stupified consciences. . . insensible of remorse, and live in affluence
of all the pleasures they relish’ (Hutcheson 1755: 203), however inferior these
might be to the pleasures of the moral sense. Now, although the ‘sanctions of
laws’ cannot be the motives for true moral behaviour, they can provide support,
a kind of crutch that deters the agent from immoral action and thus allows the
moral sense, which had previously been suppressed by the corrupt pleasures, to be
exercised regularly and thus grow in strength. Without the threat of punishments
the depraved would not even have the chance of beginning to conform to the rules
of morality, of acquiring moral habits, and thereby being corrected and reformed.
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iii. pagan philosophy and the limits of natural reason
To what extent then did these religious foundations of Hutcheson’s moral theory
require Christian revelation? Could they be known from unaided natural reason,
which was available to pagans as much as to Christians? Hutcheson clearly
believed that natural reason offers at least probable arguments for the existence of
a future state with the distribution of rewards and punishments in it. One of these
arguments is derived from the nature of the soul as an immaterial substance. The
soul cannot be a material entity, because it is capable of thought; and thought, it
was commonly argued, cannot be the result of the rearrangement of inert particles
of matter. And unlike corporeal entities, the soul is not composed of smaller
elements, but is simple and indivisible. This means that whereas physical bodies
perish when the union of material elements of which they consist is dissolved,
there is no reason to assume that the soul could ever disintegrate in the same
way. In theory the soul could be annihilated, but the complete annihilation of
any created being, whether material or spiritual, is only possible by an act of
God, not within the ordinary course of nature (Hutcheson 1742: 31–2). All
that these metaphysical and pneumatological arguments could prove however
was the possibility of a continued existence of the soul after death, not that it
necessarily survives the physical disintegration of the body. Hutcheson appears
to have believed that Christian revelation could at the very least lend certainty
to such philosophical speculations about an afterlife and divine providence. In
his short overview of the history of philosophy, published as a preface to his
student textbook on logic, the Logicae compendium, the pagan philosopher whom
Hutcheson praises most is Socrates. Socrates had come closest to forming an
accurate idea of the relationship between human beings and God and of the
implication this relationship had for moral actions. Hutcheson declared Socrates
to have been ‘the founder or author of true philosophy’ (‘[v]erae philosophiae
instaurator aut inventor’), who had turned his mind away from ‘physical and
occult things that contribute little to making a happy life’ (‘rebus corporeis et
occultis, parum ad vitam beatam facientibus’) and directed it entirely towards
‘true piety, the knowledge of God, and the cultivation of every virtue’ (‘veram
pietatem Deique cognitionem, et omnem virtutem excolendam’). Socrates taught
that the souls of humans are immortal and that they would be happy or miserable
after death, depending on how they had conducted themselves before they died
(Hutcheson 1738: 4–5). Hutcheson however does not seem to have believed that
pagan philosophers were capable of achieving certainty on this question, often
stressing the limitations of natural reason with regard to the key truths of religion,
especially concerning knowledge of the immortality of the soul and the afterlife.
Although, for example, he urged his students to go to the ‘grand fountains of all
the sciences, of all elegance; the inventers and improvers of all ingenious arts,
the Greek and Roman writers’, he added that while ‘drawing from them what
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knowledge you can’, his students ought to ‘have recourse to yet purer fountains’,
that is, the Scriptures. For they alone gave to sinful mortals ‘any sure hopes of an
happy immortality’ (Hutcheson [1747] 2007: 5; italics added). In the introduction
to his translation of the Meditations of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius,
Hutcheson noted that pagan philosophers clearly suspected the existence of a
future state, yet ‘[i]t was customary among the best philosophers, in imitation
of Socrates, to speak upon this subject with such alternatives, even when they
were persuaded that there would be a future existence. They thought this highly
probable; and yet, as they had not full certainty, they suggested proper supports
and consolations even upon the contrary supposition, and endeavoured to give
strong motives to virtue independent of future rewards’ (Hutcheson [1742] 2008:
145–6, footnote).3 The Stoics, according to Hutcheson, never developed a clear
idea of a future state (Hutcheson [1742] 2008: 75, footnote). The full benefits
of knowledge of the afterlife therefore were limited to Christians, though pagans
could have an inkling of it. This did not mean that humans had to have revelation
in order to be moral: it is not as if the desire to act morally and the ability to
distinguish between moral and immoral actions depended on the knowledge of
Scripture, but we only fully understand the foundations of morality and benefit
from the support that knowledge of an afterlife offers if we know the key truths
of revelation.
But there is also another way in which morality might be afforded divine
assistance. Hutcheson suggested that truly virtuous dispositions in pagans were
the result of Christ’s merit, which could be effective even in those pagans who had
never heard of Christ. In that sense, even pagans who were ignorant of Scriptural
revelation could be Christians:
’Tis but a late doctrine in the christian [sic] church, that the grace of God,
and all divine influences purifying the heart, were confined to such as knew
the christian history, and were by profession in the christian church. The
earliest Christians and martyrs were of a very different opinion. However,
they maintained that it is by the merits of our Saviour alone, men can either
be justified or sanctified; yet they never denyed these blessings could be
conferred on any who knew not the meritorious or efficient cause of them
[my italics – TA]. To maintain they could not, is as absurd as to assert, that
a physician cannot cure a disease, unless the patient be first instructed in the
whole art of medicine, and know particularly the physical principles by which
the several medicines operate. Nay, the early Christians believed the spirit of
Christ operated in Socrates, Plato, and other virtuous heathens; and that they
were Christians in heart, without the historical knowledge [my italics – TA].
(Hutcheson [1742] 2008: 22)
The term ‘historical knowledge’ here does not refer to knowledge of the secular
historical circumstances of Christ’s life, but to the knowledge of doctrinal truths.
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This knowledge of doctrine was known as ‘historical faith’; its opposite was
faith as the sincere reform of the heart. The sanctification of the heart could
not be achieved by human efforts alone. It depended on the merit of Christ and
on the transformation of corrupt human nature by grace. But it did not require
knowledge of the existence of Christ, his life story and death on the cross. The real
essence of Christian religious faith thus lay not in doctrinal beliefs, but in virtuous
conduct, which depended on Christ’s merit, even in those who lacked ‘historical
knowledge’ or ‘historical faith’. This was how Hutcheson was understood by
the authors of a pamphlet defending him against his orthodox opponents and
published in 1738, when there was an attempt to have him put on trial for his
allegedly heretical religious opinions. As Hutcheson’s apologists put it, he ‘never
said there was any Salvation to any of fallen Mankind, except by the Merits of
Christ, but often said, he saw no Proof, that none could reap the Benefit of his
Merits, but those who actually knew him’. And nor, they added, ‘do we see
it’ (Anon. 1738). A critic might respond that this reduced faith to a matter of
good works, but Hutcheson would reply that the virtuous deeds of a sanctified
believer are distinguished by their motives from those actions that conform to
law externally, but are performed out of fear of punishment or a crude desire
for rewards. Hutcheson is saying that while the sanctified take pleasure in acting
morally, this pleasure is not of the crass, sensual kind sought by the corrupt; and
the sanctified also do not act morally for the sake of the pleasure these moral
actions produced. The question of the importance of conduct in salvation had been
raised in debates such as the Marrow Controversy between 1718 and 1723, and
Hutcheson’s position certainly needs to be understood in relation to theological
discussions of this kind. Therefore, while Hutcheson believed morality to be
‘natural’, he also appeared sceptical about the ability of humans to achieve it
fully without some kind of divine assistance, either in the form of Scripture or
the direct infusion of grace. It is not difficult to see why Hutcheson’s views
would have appeared problematic to many Presbyterian fellow-believers, such
as Thomas Boston, whose Human Nature in its Fourfold State, first published
in 1720, was ‘the most frequently reprinted Scottish book of the eighteenth
century’, going through over a hundred editions (Ryken 2004). Boston argued
that knowledge of the message of the Gospel is essential for salvation. Only the
regenerate enjoy true, proper knowledge of Scripture, so it is not sufficient to be
familiar with the contents of the Bible, if its message is not properly absorbed.
Yet salvation without any knowledge of Scripture at all was also unthinkable. The
emphasis of Thomas Boston and other contemporary Presbyterians on doctrine
reflected a particular belief concerning the conditions of God’s forgiveness for
humans’ sins. They were convinced that human nature had been corrupt and
prone to sin since the Fall. Yet even if a particular individual were capable of
acting perfectly virtuously at all times, he or she would not thereby merit eternal
life, because the guilt of Adam and Eve’s Original Sin was transmitted from one
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human generation to the next, and remained, no matter how virtuously a person
conducted him- or herself. A newborn child who has not yet had an opportunity
to commit any particular sin, is still liable for eternal damnation because of this
inherited guilt. Only knowledge of, and sincere faith in, the merit of Christ’s death
on the cross can bring about divine forgiveness and hence salvation. Hutcheson
however argued that the merit of Christ’s death on the cross extended to people
who had never even heard of him. Pagans were capable not only of morality, but of
salvation. But that did not mean that pagan moral philosophical or religious beliefs
were true. Morality and salvation did not depend on having correct philosophical
beliefs or orthodox religious doctrines, but on the reform of the heart, which was
reflected in the individual’s conduct. Hutcheson’s belief in the ability of pagans to
be virtuous and to merit salvation did not imply that he considered them capable of
achieving these aims by virtue of their natural powers of reasoning, on which their
philosophy was based. They required supra-natural assistance, but this assistance
did not have to be offered by means of Scriptural revelation and the doctrines
derived from it; it could come immediately from God.
iv. conclusion
Hutcheson thus evidently harboured serious doubts about the validity of the
moral philosophical theories of pagan classical antiquity, including Stoicism.
However much he admired their intellectual achievements, the works of the
heathen moralists were always subject to critical evaluation from the superior
perspective of Christian modernity. Although the philosophical reasoning of
which pagans were capable could go a considerable way towards explaining the
foundations of morality, it did not offer any certainty concerning the existence
of an afterlife, without which moral theory was incomplete. Some pagans, such
as Socrates, believed in the immortality of the soul and an afterlife with rewards
and punishments, but they lacked the assurance that only Scripture could provide.
Pagans were capable of practical virtue, and even salvation, but this was not as
a result of their moral theories. It reflected the fact that pagans, according to
Hutcheson, as much as Christians could be the recipients of divine grace, which
was the means to reform human nature, which had been corrupted by Original Sin.
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notes
1 See for example Raphael (1947); Winkler (1985); Norton (1985). A more recent
intervention in this debate is Kail (2001). One of the best interpretations of Hutcheson’s
moral and political theory is still Leidhold (1985).
2 On the question of self-love in Hutcheson’s moral theory, see Grote (2006).
3 This statement might in principle be by Hutcheson’s fellow editor, James Moor, but if
that is the case it seems fair to assume that his views would have been consistent with
Hutcheson’s.
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